Tencent, China & Epstein’s “Street Level Manchurian Candidates”
Military-Civil Fusion creates strategic ambiguity in global gaming ecosystems, and the Epstein files show how elite networks intersect with China strategy.
Jeffrey Epstein’s Interest in Online Gaming, Tencent and China Strategy: What the Newly Released Files Actually Show. A brief look at five in a bed: Epstein, Tencent, China, Mandelson and Prince Andrew.
Recent releases of documents under the Epstein Transparency framework have sparked renewed scrutiny of convicted financier Jeffrey Epstein’s financial interests and geopolitical networking. Among the industries appearing in his private correspondence is the online gaming sector, including references to major global companies such as Tencent and other video game publishers.
While some commentary has framed these mentions as evidence of broader influence operations, a closer examination of the material reveals a more nuanced picture and a need for further investigation into the structural ambiguity created by China’s Military-Civil Fusion doctrine.
EFTA01032032 of the Epstein files talks about the runaway success of League of Legends and the eSports competitive video gaming market. In a section discussing how advertisers capitalize on this, it states:
“Audience demographics, which is young, passionate, male-dominated, and digital-first. They live online and on social media, are avid ad-blockers, and don't watch traditional TV or respond to conventional advertising.”
As a former British Army infantry soldier, and someone who has recruited for the British Army, I can tell you that recruitment targets were predominantly young, passionate and male-dominated. Often they came from disadvantaged backgrounds and broken homes. I was that kid. I lived that life. I am still living with the consequences of it a quarter of a century later.
In recent years, because of recruitment challenges, failings, and demographic shifts, the target pool has widened. Now the British Army would take a three legged camel as a recruit, just to boost numbers, as the private companies such as Capita and Serco can’t recruit and will not recruit to a satisfactory standard. It’s my opinion, that they care only for profit, same as the privatisation of prisons, and education, and health care and just about anything they can get there greedy hands on through cronyism backhanded deals.
So the strategic question becomes: what happens when companies operating within states that pursue Military-Civil Fusion policies participate in shaping the same demographic space that Western defence institutions draw from?
… Park that answer for a moment. Let’s look at MCF to be clear.
Military-Civil Fusion is a national strategy of the Chinese Communist Party designed to integrate civilian industry, research and academia with military objectives. Its stated aim is to ensure dual-use technologies can serve both civilian and defence purposes in pursuit of long-term strategic goals.
This creates what can be described as a corporate-state ambiguity thesis. In systems where civilian technology companies operate within a formal MCF framework, structural ambiguity exists between commercial innovation and potential state-aligned objectives. That ambiguity does not constitute proof of wrongdoing. It does, however, create strategic uncertainty.
From this wider lens, high-growth technology platforms in strategic competitor states present what can be understood as a dual-use influence risk model. Platforms with large, young, digitally native audiences represent powerful cultural and informational environments. The question is not whether they are weaponized, but whether such environments could become influence vectors under certain geopolitical conditions.
I have argued elsewhere that it is possible that companies operating within MCF systems may create indirect economic advantages that align with broader national strategies. That is a structural risk argument, not an accusation of covert operational control.
It is my fear, that MCF companies such as Tencent and the Chinese Communist dictatorship are one and the same. Or to frame it more accusatory, I believe Tencent could be used, in times of war, as a stealthy, non-kinetic, neuro-cognitive and economic warfare tool, aimed at targeting, influencing, distracting, weakening and spying on the very same target demographic who would traditionally be joining their nations to fight for democracy. Not just in America and the UK, but in Europe and the entire western world.
Online gaming communities, including those built around League of Legends and other large ecosystems, represent concentrated demographic spaces. Large digital communities of young men have historically been susceptible to identity-based narratives and ideological messaging across many political contexts. This is not unique to any one company or country. It is a broader demographic vulnerability thesis.
I suggest, over many blog articles, I believe that it is possible, that Tencent— through Riot Games (even there name hints at the civil unrest aim)— NetEase and other MCF companies, may have also systematically violated US and UK copyright infringement laws to redirect whole creative, entertainment and talent industries to China and this fits an act of economic warfare.
The target demographic is clear, Lol and other online closed communities are a breeding ground for extremism, and reaching isolated and vulnerable young men, who are easier to radicalize, isolate, shape into cultural weapons of terrorism, and even hypnotise to be Manchurian Candidates. Yes, this isn’t warmongering, this isn’t conspiratorial, its reality of this “warm war” against communism which the US, and to a lesser extent the UK, have been fighting since Post WW2, or at least since The Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953).
The term “Manchurian Candidate” originates from Cold War fiction describing individuals unknowingly influenced by foreign powers. I use the phrase “Street Level Manchurian Candidates” metaphorically to describe a theoretical vulnerability in mass digital environments, not to claim that specific individuals are under direct control.
I am not suggesting that Jeffrey Epstein acted as a proxy for Beijing. Epstein appears to have operated opportunistically, seeking influence wherever he could obtain leverage.
I am suggesting that structural ambiguity between corporate platforms and state strategy, combined with demographic concentration and geopolitical competition, creates a landscape where influence risk cannot be ignored.
I’m suggesting that it is possible, and I believe, that in times of warfare, Tencent, and by extension the Chinese communist brainwashing dictatorship, via captured, toxic and radicalised closed online communities like that of Riot Games, could have access and control over millions of “Street Level Manchurian Candidates”
Defining “Street Level Manchurian Candidates”
The phrase “Street Level Manchurian Candidates” is not an allegation of literal mind control, secret hypnosis, or direct operational command over individuals. It is a metaphor. Yet the prementioned are possible and are a real risk.
The original “Manchurian Candidate” emerged from Cold War fiction, describing a person unknowingly influenced or conditioned to act in alignment with a foreign power’s interests. It reflected fears of ideological subversion in an era of intense geopolitical rivalry.
By adding the qualifier “Street Level,” I am referring not to politicians or elite decision-makers, but to ordinary citizens embedded within mass digital ecosystems. The term is intended to describe a structural vulnerability, not a proven operation. It refers to the possibility that:
• Large, closed online communities can shape identity and worldview.
• Algorithmic environments can amplify narratives without users fully understanding how those narratives are curated.
• Youth-heavy, digitally native populations can become susceptible to influence campaigns from multiple actors.
• Platforms operating within states that formally pursue Military-Civil Fusion strategies may exist within ambiguous corporate-state relationships.
• And yes, vulnerable, isolated, traumatised and disadvantaged young and impressionable individuals can be targeted and groomed for nefarious purposes and perhaps domestic terrorism.
This concept does not assert that specific companies are actively running psychological warfare programs. It highlights the convergence of three realities:
Demographic concentration of young, digitally native users
Geopolitical competition between major powers
The dual-use nature of large-scale digital platforms
In this context, “Street Level Manchurian Candidates” describes a theoretical risk that individuals may be influenced at scale through structural features of digital environments, but also through overt coercion.
This is a warning about vulnerability and risk, not a claim of documented control.
Is advertising code for brainwashing young men?
Some online commentary surrounding the Epstein document releases has speculated about coded language in certain communications, such as “jerky” and “pizza”. It is historically true that criminal networks sometimes use euphemistic or coded terminology. However, absent pattern evidence, corroboration, or judicial findings, it would be irresponsible to assume that ordinary commercial terms in business-related documents carry hidden meanings.
In the case of EFTA01032032, references to “advertisers” appear within a standard industry analysis of esports monetisation and audience demographics. There is no documentary evidence suggesting that such language was intended as covert signalling.
Maintaining analytical discipline is important. Structural risk analysis must remain grounded in verifiable evidence, not conjecture. However, it reads a little dodgy, given the context. Perhaps advertisers is code for weaponizing youth? Probably not but given what the world now knows about Epstein and what I’ve been exposing and experiencing of the dark side of the creative industries, it wouldn’t surprise me.
A Financier Tracking Gaming Stocks
In a 2015 email disclosed in the document cache, Epstein referenced several major video game companies, including Tencent.
The context suggests investment monitoring or portfolio tracking. There is, as of yet, no evidence in the released documents of direct holdings, board-level relationships or operational influence over these companies.
Tencent, one of the world’s largest technology and gaming firms and the owner of Riot Games, developer of League of Legends, appears in the materials in an investment context. As of yet, no documentation has surfaced showing direct communications between Epstein and Tencent executives.
The China Strategy Emails
Separate documents reveal that Epstein advised former JPMorgan executive Jes Staley on business expansion in China during the late 2000s.
In these emails, Epstein provided cultural advice regarding Chinese officials, suggested establishing China-focused advisory entities, and proposed structured introductions. These communications show Epstein attempting to position himself as a geopolitical intermediary, particularly in financial and trade matters involving Beijing.
However, the released material does not demonstrate that Chinese officials directed Epstein, that a coordinated state-level influence program existed, that his advice materially shaped JPMorgan’s China strategy, or that LOL or any gaming company was used as an espionage tool.
It should be noted that my fears are not yet supported by hard evidence. There is no direct evidence That Tencent were using Riot Games as an espionage tool from soon after the launch of LOL.
Links to Peter Mandelson and Prince Andrew
Documents reference communications involving British politician Peter Mandelson and Prince Andrew in discussions about China-facing business opportunities.
Emails indicate exploratory conversations about advisory or consulting platforms tied to Beijing’s commercial ecosystem. These plans appear conceptual. No released documentation demonstrates financial transfers tied to a China venture, formal launch of a joint enterprise, or direct participation by Tencent.
Tencent’s Separate Regulatory Scrutiny
Tencent has faced separate regulatory scrutiny in the United States, including a Pentagon designation as a Chinese military company and antitrust questions regarding board representation at Epic Games. As of yet, there is no evidence linking these regulatory matters to Epstein.
Investment Curiosity vs Influence
Large financial actors routinely track technology, media, gaming and emerging markets. Epstein’s mention of Tencent appears consistent with monitoring global tech investments rather than demonstrating operational control.
To date, the documents show stock interest, advisory ambition and elite networking attempts. They do not show direct corporate collaboration, equity leverage in major gaming firms, or state-directed influence operations tied to gaming.
The Broader Pattern
The emerging portrait suggests Epstein sought to remain relevant after his conviction by inserting himself into high-level conversations about global finance and geopolitics. His interest in online gaming appears part of tracking high-growth industries intersecting with China’s expanding global footprint. Whether those ambitions translated into material influence remains unsupported by current evidence.
What the documents do illustrate, however, is that individuals operating at the margins of power networks can recognize where influence, capital and strategic advantage may converge. In a world where vast digital ecosystems aggregate data, attention and youth demographics at scale, such environments inevitably present both opportunity and risk.
This does not establish infiltration or coordinated misuse. It does suggest that global platforms operating at the intersection of technology, geopolitics and demographic concentration represent arenas that sophisticated actors may seek to understand, engage with or potentially exploit. That structural reality, rather than proven misconduct, is what warrants continued scrutiny.
Conclusion
The documents show Jeffrey Epstein expressing interest in online gaming investments and advising prominent figures on China strategy. Tencent appears as a company he was tracking financially. China’s Military-Civil Fusion doctrine creates structural ambiguity between civilian technology and state objectives. In an era of strategic competition, that ambiguity warrants scrutiny.
However, there is currently no documentary evidence linking Tencent, League of Legends, or Riot Games to wrongdoing in connection with Epstein.
Further releases may provide clarity. For now, the record shows monitoring and advisory efforts rather than operational collaboration.
Personal Interest
I should be transparent about my own position in this landscape.
I have publicly expressed concerns about what I describe as “Access is Currency in the Self-Cannibalizing Web of RICO Activity.” That phrase reflects my personal belief that, within parts of the US and UK creative industries, access to networks and gatekeepers can function as leverage that distorts markets and opportunity structures.
I am currently involved in ongoing litigation relating to my M.W. Wolf catalogue of fiction. The disputes concern the handling, representation and commercialisation of my work. Entities connected to these disputes include Tencent, Riot Games, Netflix, Curtis Brown Group, United Talent Agency, and associated corporate structures, including those linked to EQT. These matters are subject to formal legal proceedings, and I will trust the courts to determine their merits.
I have alleged in formal legal proceedings that my intellectual property was misused after submission to representatives associated with Curtis Brown Group, including Jonny Geller and Felicity Blunt.
My claims include allegations that my creative assets were exploited without proper authorisation or compensation, and that such exploitation occurred during periods in which corporate transactions involving Curtis Brown Group, United Talent Agency, Tencent, Riot Games and related entities were taking place.
I have further alleged that the valuation and commercial deployment of creative properties during these corporate transitions materially affected market perception and enterprise value. These allegations are subject to judicial determination, and I do not assert in this article that any fraud has been proven.
The matters relating to Arcane, Riot Games, and subsequent investment activity, including transactions involving EQT, form part of the broader factual matrix referenced in my pleadings. These issues remain before the courts, and I will rely on formal legal process to resolve them.
My concerns regarding Military-Civil Fusion, market consolidation and structural influence risk are separate from, though informed by, my personal experience navigating these industries. I believe that global capital flows, private equity consolidation and cross-border corporate structures can create environments where transparency is reduced, and accountability becomes more complex.
In my own experience, I observed governance and reporting developments within entities connected to my dispute during 2025.
On 30 April 2025, an “Auditor’s Resignation” filing by RSM UK Audit LLP was placed on the Companies House register in relation to Curtis Brown Group Ltd. I obtained a certified copy of that filing. The certified copy contained a one-page resignation notice but did not include a Section 519 statement of circumstances.
Under Section 519 of the Companies Act 2006, an auditor who resigns must provide a statement setting out any circumstances connected with their resignation or explicitly state that there are none. Under Section 523, the company is required to deliver that statement to the Registrar.
On 1 September 2025, I received written confirmation from Companies House that no Section 519 statement had been recorded as received in connection with that resignation. Companies House indicated that they would contact the company to rectify the matter.
In light of this, I submitted a formal complaint to the relevant professional standards body requesting clarification as to whether a Section 519 statement had been prepared and, if so, whether it had been properly delivered in accordance with statutory requirements.
During the same period, RSM UK Audit LLP also resigned as statutory auditor of Original Talent Ltd, the parent company of Curtis Brown Group. Companies House likewise confirmed that no Section 519 statement of circumstances had been recorded as received in connection with that resignation.
Subsequently, the company adopted an audit-exempt corporate structure within its broader multinational group, whose parent entity is United Talent Agency based in the United States. Multinational groups frequently adjust reporting and audit structures across jurisdictions. I do not assert that this change was unlawful. However, from the perspective of a UK-based creator engaged in litigation, such structural shifts can add complexity to regulatory oversight and transparency.
In addition, Subject Access Request disclosures provided by Curtis Brown Group and Original Talent Ltd were limited in scope and contained redactions, including the absence of certain auditor correspondence and resignation-related materials.
There was also observable professional services engagement activity involving major advisory networks during the same general timeframe as settlement discussions and governance changes. I do not assert that these developments were unlawful. Audit transitions, restructuring and advisory engagement can occur for legitimate commercial reasons, particularly within multinational groups that include entities such as United Talent Agency and private equity stakeholders including EQT.
However, when viewed collectively and in chronological proximity, these developments contribute to my concern regarding governance transparency and procedural clarity during periods of legal exposure.
I do not assert in this article that any party has acted unlawfully. The matter concerns regulatory process and compliance. From the perspective of a litigant whose case relies in part on the integrity of public filings, the absence of required statutory statements on the register raises legitimate questions that warrant clarification through appropriate regulatory channels. It is this broader structural complexity, rather than any proven illegality, that informs my concern.
Since returning to public writing, I have observed increased interest in my content from corporate domains associated with companies referenced in this article, including Curtis Brown Group, United Talent Agency, Tencent (Daily), PricewaterhouseCoopers, EQT and related advisory networks. I do not claim this constitutes wrongdoing. In an era of digital analytics and open-source monitoring, it is not unusual for public commentary to be viewed by organisations referenced within it. However, given the broader themes discussed in this article, I remain attentive to patterns that I believe warrant scrutiny.
My purpose in raising these issues is not to declare guilt or assert criminal findings outside due process. It is to highlight what I see as structural vulnerabilities within creative industries and global technology ecosystems during a period of geopolitical competition.
I want to clarify the nature of my concern.
My concern here, is not that companies referenced in this article may read what I write. I publish my work publicly for transparency, accountability and risk awareness. Public commentary is meant to be seen.
My concern is more structural. When a disadvantaged individual litigant engages with large multinational organisations that possess significant legal, financial and advisory resources, there is an inherent asymmetry of power. Public writing, in such circumstances, can become part of a broader risk assessment process within those organisations.
I do not assert that any company is acting unlawfully or fabricating evidence. However, I am mindful that corporate legal strategy may involve defensive positioning, narrative framing or procedural responses that a self-represented or disadvantaged litigant is less equipped to counter.
It is my hope that concerns raised in good faith will be addressed directly and substantively through proper channels, rather than through escalation or adversarial entrenchment.
Transparency and engagement, in my view, are more constructive than prolonged procedural conflict.
In Closing
In closing, creators should be mindful of how and where they share their work. Intellectual property is valuable, and once distributed, control over its interpretation, circulation and use can become complex.
Be thoughtful about granting access to your devices, your drafts and your networks. Understand the terms under which representation agreements are signed. Maintain records. Seek independent advice where possible. Be attentive to the online communities you participate in. Large digital ecosystems can shape perspective and identity in subtle ways. Remain vigilant about radicalisation dynamics, narrative manipulation and information asymmetry, regardless of political direction.
In an era defined by geopolitical competition, corporate consolidation and globalised capital flows, digital literacy is no longer optional. Awareness is not paranoia and prudence is not hostility. The objective is not disengagement. It is informed engagement, transparency and accountability.
I predict a mass exodus of some of the prementioned talent management companies, once The Wolf Truth catches the cheaters!
M.W. WOLF
